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Abstract— Vehicular communication (VC) systems have re-
cently drawn the attention of industry, authorities, and
academia. A consensus on the need to secure VC systems and
protect the privacy of their users led to concerted efforts to
design security architectures. Interestingly, the results different
project contributed thus far bear extensive similarities in terms
of objectives and mechanisms. As a result, this appears to be
an auspicious time for setting the corner-stone of trustworthy
VC systems. Nonetheless, there is a considerable distance to
cover till their deployment. This paper ponders on the road
ahead. First, it presents a distillation of the state of the art,
covering the perceived threat model, security requirements,
and basic secure VC system components. Then, it dissects
predominant assumptions and design choices and considers
alternatives. Under the prism of what is necessary to render
secure VC systems practical, and given possible non-technical
influences, the paper attempts to chart the landscape towards
the deployment of secure VC systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over a number of years, Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS) and related technologies have been deployed; for
toll collection, fleet logistics and management, anti-theft
protection, pay-as-you-go insurance, traffic information, and
active road-side signs. Such systems, relying on different
communication technologies, continue to evolve and pro-
liferate. A new trend has recently emerged: the integration
of on-board computing units (OBUs) and IEEE 802.11p
radios for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to road-
side infrastructure (V2I) communication. These vehicular
communication (VC) systems enhance transportation safety
and efficiency. V2V communication enables real-time safety
applications, extending the driver’s horizon, while both V2V
and V2I communication enhance the versatility and effective-
ness of applications for environmental awareness, VC system
information dissemination, and in-vehicle entertainment.
However, the unique features of VC are a double-edged
sword: a rich set of tools are offered to drivers and author-
ities, but a formidable set of abuses and attacks becomes
possible. An attacker could “contaminate” large portions of
the vehicular network with false information, announcing, for
example, non-existent dangerous or congested road condi-
tions, misleading drivers and causing traffic jams. Or, drivers
could purchase software or hardware VC system “hacks,”
as they now often purchase police radar detectors or mod-
ify their cars for additional horse-power. Such VC system
modifications could, for example, allow private vehicles to
transmit messages as if they were an emergency vehicle
(ambulance, police patrol, or road maintenance vehicle),
have unsuspected drivers notified by their OBUs to slow
down and yield, and this way offer fast movement even
in traffic jams. From a different point of view, receivers
deployed in a city center, at highway exits, or even in a
celebrities neighborhood, could record transmissions from
by-passing vehicles to later trace their location and infer
private information about their passengers.
These exploits show that security is needed, especially
because attacks are relatively easy to mount. First, VC rely
on the widely adopted IEEE 802.11 wireless communication
technology. Moreover, attackers could use any low-cost com-
puting platform, such as PDAs, laptops, or WLAN access
points (APs); for example, a wireless network operator,
licensed to provide services unrelated to VC systems, could
“tune” its APs to intercept VC traffic. Finally, VC equipment
can be left unattended for long periods, increasing the
likelihood of physical compromise. Overall, without security,
VC systems could make anti-social and criminal behavior
easier, in ways that would actually jeopardize the benefits of
their deployment.
The awareness on the need to secure VC spurred a
number of activities, with ongoing efforts, by SeVeCom [6]
and IEEE 1609.2 [4], to design VC security architectures.
Sec. II provides a condensed survey of the most recent
understanding in terms of threats, requirements, and mech-
anisms. But with significant commonalities among results
from different projects, is the problem largely solved? Are
there any research questions that remain to be addressed?
Or, is it more or less clear which VC security architecture
will be instantiated and deployed?
In this paper, we reflect exactly on these questions, which
would be tempting to answer in an affirmative manner. We re-
visit a number of commonly understood technical approaches
and discuss alternative view points. Then, we consider non-
technical factors that are likely to influence the deployment
of secure VC systems. In spite of significant progress in
terms of security, several issues remain to be addressed and
system aspects to be crystalized towards deployment. At the
same time, the development of security architectures can
influence the design of VC systems. Even though surprising
turns or obstacles can always be encountered, one can be
optimistic that trustworthy VC systems will be deployed.
II. SECURE VC SYSTEMS
A. Adversary Model
VC system entities can be correct or benign, that is,
comply with the implemented protocols, or deviate from the
protocol definition being faulty or adversaries. Faults may
not be malicious; for example, the communication module of
a node (vehicle OBU or road-side unit (RSU)) may discard or
delay messages or set packet fields to inappropriate values.
But malicious behavior can result in a much larger set of
faults. A detailed discussion of adversary models and aspects
germane to VC systems is provided in [8]. Adversaries
can be internal, with cryptographic keys and credentials
to participate in the protocol(s) execution. Or, they can be
external, but still able to influence the protocols by jamming
communications and replaying messages of other nodes.
Even though the VC implementations will be proprietary,
standards, needed for inter-operability, will provide extensive
information on the VC protocol stack. Attackers will be able
to build their own rogue protocols and modify the func-
tionality of VC system nodes. If they obtain compromised
cryptographic keys, for example, physically extracted from
a node, they can act as internal adversaries. In fact, a node
holding multiple such keys can appear as multiple nodes.
More generally, many adversarial nodes can be present.
Often, they can act individually, but they might also act
in collusion, coordinating their actions. Even if they do
so, they should be unwilling to share their private keys
and allow another node to fully impersonate them (and
obtain, for example, their access rights). Over time, the
number of adversaries can change, depending on the type
of compromise as well as the defensive reaction of the
system. It is reasonable to expect that at any point in time
a small fraction of the network nodes are adversaries. At
any time and location, only a few adversaries are likely to
be physically present. This does not preclude a group of
adversarial nodes surrounding a correct one, but such as a
situation should be rare.
A rather peculiar type of adversary is relevant to VC sys-
tems: an input-controlling adversary, which alters (sensory)
inputs to VC protocols, rather than compromising the proto-
cols. Such an adversary is weaker than an arbitrary internal
adversary, because it cannot induce arbitrary behavior. But
it will be often much easier to affect inputs, or compromise
sensors or sensor-OBU connections, than compromising the
OBU itself.
B. Security Requirements
Without considering specific applications and protocols,
a list of general security requirements are identified. Mes-
sage authentication and integrity, to protect messages from
alteration and allow receivers to corroborate the node that
created the message. If necessary, entity authentication can
provide evidence of the sender liveness, that is, the fact
it generated a message recently. To prevent a sender from
denying having sent a message, non repudiation is needed.
Furthermore, access control and authorization can determine
what each node is allowed to do in the network, in terms
of the implemented system functionality. Confidentiality can
keep message content secret from unauthorized nodes.
Related to information hiding, privacy and anonymity are
required, at least at the level of protection achieved before
the advent of VC systems. In general, VC systems should not
disclose or allow inferences on private user information. In
particular, the identity of a vehicle performing a VC-specific
action (e.g., transmitting a message) should be concealed.
Anonymity, with respect to an observer, depends on the set
of vehicles: an observer cannot determine which among all
vehicles in that set performed an action. In other words, any
two actions by the same vehicle cannot be linked. Under
specific circumstances, an observer could consider a vehicle
more likely to perform an action.
Rather than seeking strong anonymity along with authen-
tication (and other security requirements), less stringent re-
quirements are considered. Cryptographically protected mes-
sages should not allow the identification of their sender, and
two or more messages generated by the same vehicle should
be difficult to link to each other. More precisely, messages
produced by a node over a protocol-selectable period of time
τ can be linked, but messages m1,m2 generated at times
t1, t2 such that t2 > t1 + τ cannot. The shorter τ is, the fewer
the linkable messages are, and the harder to trace a node
becomes.
Beyond security and anonymity, availability is also sought,
so that VC systems remain operational even in the presence
of faults, and resume normal operation after the removal of
the faulty nodes. Another significant dimension is that of
non-cryptographic security, including the determination of
data correctness or consistency. Traditionally, if the sender
of a message is trusted, then the content of the message is
trusted as well. This notion is valid for long-lived, static trust
relationships, but in VC systems there is often no ground
for similar approaches. It is thus necessary to assess the
trustworthiness of data per se, as obtained by other nodes in
the VC system.
C. Basic Secure VC System Elements
VC systems will rely on multiple Certification Authorities
(CAs), each managing the long-term identities and creden-
tials for nodes registered in its region (e.g., canton or state).
Each node is uniquely identified, and it holds one or more
private-public key pairs and certificates. The CA attests
to the attributes of each registered node, according to its
capabilities and roles in the system. The CAs are responsible
for evicting nodes from the system, for administrative or
technical reasons, if needed. The CAs interact infrequently
with nodes, utilizing RSUs as a gateway.
The basic tool for nodes to secure communication is to
digitally sign messages, after attaching a time-stamp and
the signer’s location and certificate to the message. This
way, modification, forgery, replay, and relay attacks can be
defeated. The latter relates to secure neighbor discovery [12],
which is possible exactly because safety beacons include
the time and location at the point they are sent across the
wireless medium [13], [14]. Signatures can be applied in
different ways, to beacons, multi-hop flooded, and position-
based [3] multi- or uni-casted messages, not only by the
message originator but also by relaying nodes.
To provide both security and a degree of anonymity, long-
term keys and credentials are not used to secure communica-
tion. Rather, the approach of pseudonymity or pseudonymous
authentication is used. Each vehicle is equipped with mul-
tiple certified public keys (pseudonyms) that do not reveal
the node identity. It obtains those pseudonyms by a trusted
third party, a pseudonym provider (PNP), by proving it is
registered with a CA. Then, the vehicle uses each pseudonym
and private key for at most for τ seconds, the pseudonym
lifetime, and then discards it. Messages signed under the
same pseudonym can be trivially linked, but messages signed
under different pseudonyms cannot.
III. ON DESIGN CHOICES AND APPROACHES
A. To Secure or Not to Secure?
One may pose a legitimate question: Is an arguably
complex secure VC system necessary? Cellular telephony
and nomadic wireless Internet access were deployed without
strong security features, they proliferated and continue to do
so, in spite of significant security and privacy breaches. But
the significant differences of VC systems from those two
systems imply why a different approach is necessary. First,
cellular and nomadic network access rely on infrastructure,
which simplifies the provision of security; for example,
associations (trust) is needed between the mobile node and
the infrastructure. Moreover, a compromise would not have
costly or even fatal consequences, as those of a multi-car
accident caused by attacking a VC system.
With higher stakes for VC systems (reducing accidents,
saving lives, improving transportation), a single security inci-
dent would perhaps suffice for the public to loose confidence
in this new technology. Then, assuming sufficient security
is in place, one can ponder on the degree of protection
a security architecture should and can offer. Would strong
cryptographic protection of network and application proto-
cols suffice to ensure that false data are not injected in the
system? Or, would anonymous or pseudonymous authenti-
cation ensure location privacy when numerous cameras and
optical plate recognition systems are deployed?
VC security does not address problems that are present
independently of the use of VC. But it fends off a broad
range of exploits that could otherwise wreak havoc to VC
and the transportation system. External adversaries or vehicle
modifications are mitigated, the results of key compromise
are thwarted, and accountability, even if anonymous authen-
tication is used, can lead to the eviction of adversarial nodes.
Until this happens, redundancy or absence of corroborating
evidence by other near-by vehicles could enable inferring
the truthfulness of received VC application messages. Initial
results are promising, showing that data centric trust estab-
lishment is feasible [16]. Investigations for specific applica-
tions, complex environments, as well as measures to thwart
determined adversaries, can lead to stronger protection.
B. Public Key Cryptography or What?
The high volatility and large scale of VC systems led to
the choice of digital signatures. For the choice of appropriate
algorithms the following basic factors were considered: The
processing times for signature generation and verification,
the security overhead (public key and signature sizes), the
standardization of cryptographic algorithms (and confidence
in their strength), and the experience in implementation.
Elliptic Curve-based algorithms (e.g. EC-DSA) seem to be
preferred, primarily because of low network overhead for
strong security.
Security levels for VC system entities have not been
concretized yet, but 80-bit or higher security seem to be
favored, to prevent practical cryptanalytic attacks. It is im-
portant though to consider for which operation a specific
security level for cryptographic primitives is needed. Clearly,
CAs and PNPs should have higher security levels. Then,
high security would be needed for long-term keys and
certificates. The lowest level should be assigned to short-
term keys, for which security levels below 80-bits could be
perhaps considered. Even if such a key, valid for minutes or
hours, were broken within weeks or months by a determined
adversary, there would be no immediate consequences, only
a reduction in overhead. Of course, this would be true if and
only if VC traffic were not used in the long-run, for example,
logged for future liability attribution (Sec. IV-C).
We can also consider alternatives to “classic” public key
cryptography, which can lead to usability limitations if strong
anonymity is sought. The larger the number of pseudonyms a
vehicle needs (in the extreme, one per message it transmits),
the higher the overhead for generating the key pairs and
certificates will be. Obtaining those would be costly, if done
over a cellular link for example. But privacy protection or
even availability problems can appear if vehicles are unable
to obtain new pseudonyms. The use of anonymous long-
term cryptographic material and anonymous authentication
can enable on-board, on-the-fly generation of short-term keys
and credentials. This is shown to be a viable approach in [1],
which can be strengthened to prevent abuse of anonymous
authentication [2].
C. Are Secure VC Systems Practical?
With specific proposals in the literature, it is important
to assess their practicality: Can secure VC systems satisfy
stringent application requirements? This is a fundamental
question for VC systems in general, but it becomes all the
more relevant due to the significant communication and pro-
cessing overhead and other restrictions security and privacy-
enhancing mechanisms impose. Consider, for example, a
safety application that notifies on emergency braking: can
vehicle collisions be still avoided after adding security?
Simulation studies over a range of settings and protocols for
pseudonymous authentication indicate that with the appropri-
ate system design, secure VC can be in practice as effective
as unsecured VC [1], [7].
D. Processing Power
The OBU processing power is critical for the practicality
of secure VC systems. The cryptographic validation of
received messages is the primary component of process-
ing load, especially in dense topologies. Based on results
in [1], [7], also considering anonymous authentication as
part of a pseudonymous authentication system, experimental
platforms currently considered for VC systems would be
insufficient. They could not sustain cryptographic process-
ing, even if revocation status checking (and thus overhead)
were not considered, under dense network conditions (e.g.,
in congested multi-lane highways). Beyond optimizations,
increased processing power is needed, with cryptographic
co-processors being one option, so that nodes validate all
or a high fraction of messages within application constraints
(e.g., in the order of 100ms for safety).
E. Can VC Equipment be Trusted?
The low physical protection of VC system nodes and the
motivation of attackers raise the question if VC equipment
can be trusted. It appears that if this were the case, with the
appropriate security in place, the overall problem of securing
VC systems could be addressed. However, cost is major
concern, and making the entire on-board equipment tamper-
proof or tamper-resistant would be impractical. Nonetheless,
there are critical resources that must be protected: a Trusted
Component (TC), for example, as proposed by SeVeCom,
should store private keys and perform private cryptographic
operations. With a tamper-resistant TC, extraction of the
private keys would be impossible. With a real-time clock and
battery integrated in the TC, the adversary would be unable to
feed the TC with fake future time-stamps and obtain falsified
cryptographically protected messages.
F. Is Revocation Necessary?
To ensure the robustness of the VC system, it is important
to evict faulty nodes and prevent the utilization of compro-
mised keys. The distribution of Revocation Lists (RLs) is
the basic approach to do this in VC systems [6], [11], com-
plemented by other defense mechanisms or enhancements
[5], [15]. More important, leveraging on relatively sparsely
placed road-side infrastructure, and with low bandwidth
consumption by RSUs, all vehicles can obtain the latest
RL within an average commute time [11]. Nonetheless, the
processing overhead to control if a node is in the RL can be
high, primarily because of anonymity mechanisms. For “clas-
sic” cryptography, each pseudonymous certificate should be
validated at first reception, but with many pseudonyms per
vehicle the RL will be large. For anonymous credentials,
each received message should be checked against the much
shorter RL, but each check is orders of magnitude costlier
than that for “classic” cryptography.
The challenge is not the RL distribution but rather its
on-board processing cost, which is proportional to the RL
length. The question follows naturally: Is it necessary to
ignore messages signed by all nodes in a RL? In fact, this is
closely related to the composition of the RL. For example,
if a stolen vehicle is in the RL, its VC equipment is not
necessarily compromised; thus, it would be unwise for the
safety of receiving vehicles to ignore its messages. A flexible
approach to address the problem could reduce the length
of the RL and thus the processing overhead: Distinct RLs
are created, according to the “urgency” of using them for
real-time message validation. The RL of highest priority,
processed at all times, can contain only evidently faulty or
compromised nodes. At a lower priority can be a RL with
nodes that are potentially faulty, perhaps, in different RLs
according to the type of fault, and at the lowest priority an
RL with nodes evicted for other reasons. Lower priority RLs
can checked if possible or if a specific event triggers the need
to do so (e.g., suspected faulty behavior by a near-by node).
IV. SOME NARROW PASSAGES AHEAD
A. Bringing VC to the Market
The way VC systems will be deployed can significantly
influence security solutions and thus the system trustworthi-
ness. The primary question is whether the VC deployment
will be monolithic or evolutionary, with no negative or
positive connotation for either term. In other words, will
the OBU be one or two powerful, multi-purpose box(es), or
perhaps a multi-core processor, running all protocols? Or,
will it be a set of boxes, each of them added on-board
gradually, running a single application with just enough
processing power for the specific tasks?
The monolithic model resembles what is considered thus
far in the development of secure VC architectures. But the
evolutionary approach may be closer to what a strongly
market-centric deployment commands, driven by the applica-
tions (e.g., entertainment) preferred by consumers. Reflecting
the mind-set of some stakeholders, the evolutionary deploy-
ment would lead most likely to a minimum application-
specific security, as well as a heterogeneous on-board net-
work. The situation would become more involved if user
devices (e.g., PDAs, cell-phones, home or corporate com-
puters) interact with the OBUs, to obtain for example useful
personal information for navigation, record trip data into a
personal log, or access physical spaces or digital content. All
these aspects would raise new challenges in terms of security
and privacy.
B. Organizational Issues
The reliance on authorities (Sec. II) is in sync with long-
lived approaches in managing vehicles [10]. However, the
efforts to operate CAs often result in a degree of skepticism,
with frequently recurring questions on the CA operational
cost or the difficulties of collaboration among diverse CAs.
The alternative of vehicle manufacturers running their own
CAs is considered. Nonetheless, this raises concerns on
monopoly or oligopoly situations that could be imposed this
way, or even the likelihood that proprietary solutions that do
not provide full-fledged security might be adopted.
Existing multi-domain systems such as cellular systems,
which require access control and accounting, indicate that ad-
dressing organizational issues is feasible. In fact, the success
story of cellular systems can provide useful clues. Numerous
distinct providers, each having high numbers of registered
clients and devices, each of them uniquely identified and
able to operate in other regions and billed for network usage
via its “home” provider, provide interesting features and even
similarities to ponder on.
C. Legal Issues
User awareness of the offered protection is paramount:
The guarantees the VC system offers, the residual vul-
nerabilities, and the role of all system entities should be
clearly stated to end user agreements. Analogies can be
drawn to existing systems, for example, with recent privacy
breaches against cellular telephony perpetrated via mobile
device exploits or by insiders. The responsibility of each
entity, the users included, should be clear, as this also relates
to VC equipment maintenance and accreditation.
The use of VC systems towards assisting the attribution
of liability for transportation incidents is a controversial
issue. Clearly, a non-secure VC system would be out of the
question for such a task. Strong accountability in secure VC
systems, as discussed above, is possible. But determining
which entity and under which circumstances can perform
this, and then through which procedure liability can be
attributed, is far from straightforward.
Policies for VC systems will also have to deal with the
issue of voluntary or mandatory use of the equipment. Will,
for example, safety and traffic efficiency functionality be
mandatory, the same way nowadays seat-belts are? It is
likely that users have the incentive, for example, to run those
applications in order to lower their insurance premiums.
But if deployment is mandatory, would privacy concerns
be fully addressed? Solutions discussed above can indeed
achieve this. But users may still raise legitimate arguments
in favor of powering off their VC boxes. Or, perhaps raise
the need for distinct secure VC instantiations, for example,
for government vehicles that do not wish to take any risk of
being traced by terrorists.
V. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
Significant progress has been made already towards com-
prehensive security solutions for VC systems. It is very
interesting to realize that all these results are produced at
a stage when the actual VC systems are several years from
deployment. Essentially, security for VC systems is being
developed at design time. This allows for a deep and early
understanding of the problem at hand. Equally important,
security designs can influence VC protocols and applications.
For example, OBU characteristics can be set to a certain
standard to enable security; or protocol features that enhance
performance but allow high-impact exploits can be disabled
for enhanced resilience.
Of course, as the VC protocols and applications mature,
and continue to evolve after deployment, an even clearer
understanding of threats and possible exploits will be possi-
ble. In all cases, it is paramount to avoid misconceptions on
that front, with a characteristic example Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSS) used to provide accurate location
and time. With few exceptions, commercial systems such as
GPS are assumed secure, even though attacks even against
upcoming systems allow an adversary to manipulate the
position estimated by GNSS receivers [9]. If VC systems
are deployed with meagre or no defenses, high-profile or
disastrous exploits can take place, leading at a later stage
authorities and car manufacturers to summon security experts
to address the problem. But with the current extensive
interest, rising awareness, and significant results, there is a
unique opportunity to have trustworthy VC systems at their
initial deployment.
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